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By considering a model with identical firms, Paul Krugman (1980) predicts that a higher elas-
ticity of substitution between goods magnifies the impact of trade barriers on trade flows. In this 
paper, I introduce firm heterogeneity in a simple model of international trade. When the distribu-
tion of productivity across firms is Pareto, which is close to the observed size distribution of US 
firms, the predictions of the Krugman model with representative firms are overturned: the impact 
of trade barriers on trade flows is dampened by the elasticity of substitution, and not magnified.
In Krugman (1980), identical countries trade differentiated goods despite the presence of trade 
barriers because consumers have a preference for variety. If goods are less substitutable, con-
sumers are willing to buy foreign varieties even at a higher cost, and trade barriers have little 
impact on bilateral trade flows. Total exports from country A to country B are given by the fol-
lowing expression:
 GDPA 3 GDPB ExportsAB 5 Constant 3                    , 1Trade barriersAB2 s
where s is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. A crucial assumption in this model is 
that all firms are identical, and that the only form of transportation cost is a variable cost. Under 
these assumptions, every firm exports to every country in the world. Trade barriers have a strong 
impact on trade flows when the elasticity of substitution between goods is high. Competition is 
fierce when the elasticity of substitution is high, and any cost disadvantage translates into large 
losses of market share.
In this paper, I add firm heterogeneity in productivity, as well as fixed costs of exporting. 
These simple amendments introduce a new margin of adjustment: the extensive margin. When 
transportation costs vary, not only does each exporter change the size of its exports (the intensive 
margin), but the set of exporters varies as well (the extensive margin). The main finding of this 
paper is that the elasticity of substitution has opposite effects on each margin. A higher elastic-
ity makes the intensive margin more sensitive to changes in trade barriers, whereas it makes the 
extensive margin less sensitive. The reason is the following. When trade barriers decrease, new 
and less productive firms enter the export market. When the elasticity of substitution is high, a 
low productivity is a severe disadvantage. These less productive firms can capture only a small 
market share. The impact of those new entrants on aggregate trade is small. On the other hand, 
when the elasticity is low, each firm is sheltered from competition. The new entrants capture a 
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large market share. The impact of those new entrants on aggregate trade is large. So a higher 
elasticity of substitution magnifies the sensitivity of the intensive margin to changes in trade bar-
riers, whereas it dampens the sensitivity of the extensive margin.
Which effect dominates? I prove that when the distribution of productivity across firms is 
Pareto, which is a good approximation of the observed distribution of US firms,1 the effect on 
the extensive margin dominates. My augmented model predicts that total exports from country 
A to country B are given by the following expression:
 GDPA 3 GDPB ExportsAB 5 Constant 3                     with e9 1s2 , 0. 1Trade barriersAB2 e 1s2
The elasticity of aggregate trade with respect to trade barriers (both variable and fixed), e, is 
negatively related to the elasticity of substitution, s. Variable trade barriers enter the gravity 
equation with an exponent that depends only on the distribution of productivity and not on the 
elasticity of substitution, and fixed trade barriers with an exponent that is inversely related to the 
elasticity of substitution.
The model with heterogeneous firms also predicts that the same trade barriers will have a 
larger impact on trade flows than in the model with representative firms. When trade barriers 
decrease, each firm exports more. In addition, new firms start exporting. This adjustment on the 
extensive margin is quantitatively important. Given the observed distribution of firm size in the 
United States, I predict that the elasticity of trade flows with respect to variable trade barriers 
such as tariffs is twice as large as it would be in the absence of firm heterogeneity.
The prediction, that the effect of trade barriers on trade flows is magnified by the elasticity of 
substitution, is not specific to Krugman’s model of trade. Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff 
(2001), for example, explain the six major puzzles in International Macroeconomics by the exis-
tence of trade barriers. The simple model they spell out to illustrate how plausible values for 
trade barriers can have a large impact on trade flows relies on the magnification by the elasticity 
of substitution. James E. Anderson (1979) presents a theoretical foundation for the gravity equa-
tion based on the Armington assumption of competitive trade in goods differentiated by country 
of origin. In both models, a higher elasticity of substitution will magnify the effect of trade bar-
riers on trade flows, even in the absence of increasing returns or monopolistic competition.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce the extensive margin of trade in a simple and 
tractable model with multiple countries and asymmetric trade barriers. The elasticity of aggregate 
trade flows with respect to trade barriers is larger than what traditional models would predict. It is 
not equal to the elasticity of substitution; it is inversely related to the elasticity of substitution.
In the remainder of this section, I review previous work related to this model, and existing 
empirical evidence that supports the predictions of this model.
Marc Melitz (2003) introduces firm heterogeneity in a general equilibrium model of interna-
tional trade. I expand Melitz’s model in the following way. I consider a world with many asym-
metric countries, separated by asymmetric trade barriers. I then study the strategic choice of 
firms to export or not, and if they export, which countries to target. I embed my model in a global 
equilibrium. Such a model generates predictions for the structure of bilateral trade flows. I can 
pin down which firm from which country is able to enter a given market, and how it is affected 
by competition from local and other foreign firms, even in the presence of asymmetric bilateral 
trade barriers. The presence of fixed costs associated with entering foreign markets provides a 
simple foundation for the extensive margin of trade.
1 See Erzo G. J. Luttmer (2007) for the most recent evidence, and this introduction for further references.
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Elhanan Helpman, Melitz, and Yona Rubinstein (forthcoming) develop a similar extension to 
the Melitz model with multiple countries. Using bounded support for the productivity shocks, 
they can make use of the information contained in the zeros of the trade matrices and improve 
on the traditional gravity regressions. They do not, however, generate analytical solutions for the 
extensive margin of trade. This gives them more flexibility in estimating empirically the prob-
ability that exporters enter a given foreign market. But it prevents them from deriving precise 
predictions for the role of variable and fixed costs in explaining both the intensive and the exten-
sive margins of international trade.
Kim J. Ruhl (2005) builds a dynamic version of the Melitz model to explain the so-called 
elasticity puzzle. He argues that in response to high frequency transitory shocks, most of the 
adjustments of exports happen at the intensive margin, whereas in response to permanent shocks 
such as trade liberalization, both the intensive and the extensive margins adjust. I abstract from 
any dynamic considerations and build a model of the steady-state trade flows between many 
countries. Costas Arkolakis (2007) offers an extension to the current model to explain the exis-
tence of small exporters, even in the presence of fixed trade barriers. He proposes that firms can 
decide what fraction of a market they want to access, where the fixed entry cost increases with 
the number of consumers reached.
Jonathan Eaton, Sam Kortum, and Francis Kramarz (2007) find that the current model pro-
vides a good description of firm-level trade using data on French exporters. Among others, the 
current model predicts correctly many of the patterns of entry of heterogeneous firms into dif-
ferent markets, and the relationship between the size of a firm on its domestic market, and the 
number of foreign markets it enters. The assumption that productivity shocks are Pareto distrib-
uted provides a good fit for the firm-level data: it describes precisely the distribution of firm size 
within France, as well as which foreign markets a given firm enters.
There is wide empirical evidence that the Pareto distribution is a good approximation of the 
upper tail of the distribution of firm sizes. Since exporters are overwhelmingly large firms, and 
therefore in the upper tail of the size distribution, this distribution is a good candidate for a 
theoretical model of firm selection into export markets. Herbert A. Simon and Charles P. Bonini 
(1958) first noted that the size distribution of firm sizes is well described by a Pareto distribu-
tion. Recent evidence on this empirical regularity for the United States include Robert L. Axtell 
(2001) and Luttmer (2007). Xavier Gabaix (2008) provides a survey on the prevalence of “power 
law” distributions for firms in the United States and in Europe. Helpman, Melitz, and Stephen 
Yeaple (2004) estimate a Pareto distribution for both US and European firms to predict foreign 
direct investment in different sectors.
The closest evidence in support of the predictions of the current model are James E. Rauch 
(1999), Martin Andersson (2007), Matthieu Crozet and Pamina Koenig (2007), and Koenig 
(2005). Rauch finds that trade barriers have a milder impact on trade volumes for goods that 
are more homogenous. He defines homogenous goods as goods that are traded on organized 
exchanges, or goods that have a reference price. He argues that acquiring information about 
differentiated goods is costly, so that effectively differentiated goods face a higher trade barrier. 
This reasoning can, however, explain why there should be more trade in homogenous goods, but 
not why given trade barriers should have a bigger impact. The current model offers an alternative 
explanation for the interaction between product differentiation and trade barriers. I spell out a 
clear theoretical channel through which product differentiation affects trade barriers. Andersson 
(2007) uses firm-level export data on Swedish firms. He separates out the impact of variable 
trade barriers and the impact of fixed trade barriers (proxied by measures of “familiarity” of 
markets), and separates out their impact on the intensive and extensive margins of trade. First, 
he finds that fixed costs have a larger impact on the extensive margin than on the intensive 
margin of trade. Moreover, the impact of fixed trade barriers on the extensive margin is larger 
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for differentiated goods than for homogenous goods.2 Crozet and Koenig (2007) use firm-level 
export data on French firms to structurally estimate the current model. The panel dimension 
of the data allows them to separate out the distance elasticity of trade costs from the elasticity 
of exports with respect to trade barriers. Koenig (2005) uses the same firm-level export data 
on French firms. As the current model predicts, she finds that the distance elasticity of indi-
vidual firm exports (the intensive margin) is larger in sectors where goods are more homogenous, 
whereas the distance elasticity of the number of firms (the extensive margin) is smaller in sectors 
where goods are more homogenous. In addition, she finds that the share of exports explained by 
the extensive margin is larger in sectors with more differentiated goods. At the aggregate level, 
unlike the predictions of this model, she finds that in sectors with homogenous goods, the dis-
tance elasticity of total exports is mildly larger than in sectors with differentiated goods, but this 
difference is not significant.
Finally, several authors have stressed the quantitative importance of the extensive margin in 
explaining aggregate trade flows. David Hummels and Peter J. Klenow (2005) find that larger 
and wealthier countries trade more, and that 60 percent of the difference in aggregate trade flows 
comes from differences in the number of goods traded. Along a slightly different line, Kei-Mu Yi 
(2003) argues that the increase in trade in intermediate goods, which amounts to trade in more 
goods, can help explain the observed increase in international trade in the last decades. All find 
a strong response of the extensive margin to changes in trade barriers or country size that are 
consistent with the current model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces a simple model of 
international trade with heterogeneous firms and derives partial equilibrium results. In Section II, 
I compute the general equilibrium of the world economy. Finally, Section III identifies separately 
the adjustments of the intensive and the extensive margins of trade, in response to changes in 
both variable and fixed trade barriers.
I.  Setup
In this section, I introduce the basic ingredients of the model. I define preferences and 
technologies, and I characterize the optimal strategies of both firms and consumers in partial 
equilibrium.
There are N potentially asymmetric countries that produce goods using only labor. Country n 
has a population Ln. Consumers in each country maximize utility derived from the consumption 
of goods from H 1 1 sectors. Sector 0 provides a single homogenous good. The other H sectors 
are made of a continuum of differentiated goods. If a consumer consumes qo units of good 0, and 
qh 1v 2 units of each variety v of good h, for all varieties in the set Vh (determined in equilibrium), 
she gets a utility U,
(1)  U  ;  qom0 qH
h51
 q3
Vh
 qh 1v 2 1sh212/sh dvr 3sh / 1sh212 4 mh,
where m0 1 gHh51 mh 5 1, and where sh . 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties 
of good h. I assume that H . 1 so that I can compare sectors characterized by different degrees 
of product substitutability.3
2 The impact of distance is also larger, which suggests that distance proxies for both variable and some fixed costs.
3 It is empirically more relevant to compare sectors with different degrees of product substitutability than to com-
pare different economies.
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Trade Barriers and Technology.—The homogenous good 0 is freely traded and is used as 
the numeraire. It is produced under constant returns to scale with one unit of labor in country n 
producing wn units of good 0. Its price is set equal to 1 so that if country n produces this good, 
the wage in country n is wn. I shall consider only equilibria where every country produces some 
of the numeraire.4 This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis. It allows countries to differ 
both in size 1Ln 2 and in productivity 1wn 2 . There are two types of trade barriers, a variable and 
a fixed cost. The variable cost takes the form of an “iceberg” transportation cost. If one unit of 
any differentiated good h is shipped from country i to country j, only a fraction 1/t hij arrives. The 
rest melts on the way. The higher t, the higher the variable trade cost.5 In addition, if a firm from 
country i in sector h exports to country j, it must pay a fixed cost fij
h, in units of the numeraire.
All countries have access to the same technology. Due to the presence of fixed costs, firms 
in the differentiated sectors operate under increasing returns-to-scale technology. Each firm in 
sector h draws a random unit labor productivity w. The cost of producing q units of a good and 
selling them in country j for a firm with productivity w is
(2)  cij
h 1q 2 5 withij
w
 q 1 fij
h.
Firms are price setters. Given that demand functions are isoelastic, the optimal price charged in 
country j by firm w from country i is a constant mark-up over the unit cost (including transporta-
tion costs): pij
h 1w 2 5 sh/ 1sh 2 12 3 wi t hij /w.
As in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), I assume that productivity shocks are drawn from a 
Pareto distribution with shape parameter gh : productivity is distributed over 31, 1 ` 2 according to 
(3)  P 1w˜ h , w 2 5 Gh 1w 2 5 1 2 w2gh, 
with gh . sh 2 1. An inverse measure of the heterogeneity in sector h is given by gh. Sectors with 
a high g are more homogenous, in the sense that more output is concentrated among the smallest 
and least productive firms.6 The assumption that productivity shocks are Pareto distributed is 
made first for analytical tractability, and second because it provides a good approximation of the 
distribution of firm sizes in the United States.7
I assume that the total mass of potential entrants in country n in each differentiated sector is 
proportional to wn Ln , so that larger and wealthier countries have more entrants. This assumption 
greatly simplifies the analysis. It is similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002), where the set of goods 
is exogenously given. Since I do not impose free entry, firms generate net profits that have to be 
redistributed. I assume that each worker owns wn shares of a global fund. The fund collects prof-
its from all firms and redistributes them in units of the numeraire good to its shareholders.
Demand for Differentiated Goods.—The total income spent by workers in country j, yj , is 
the sum of their labor income 1wj Lj 2 and of the dividends they get from their portfolio 1wj Lj p2 , 
where p is the dividend per share of the global mutual fund. Given the optimal pricing of firms, 
4 As long as the share of the homogenous good, m0 , is large enough, or trade barriers in the other sectors are large 
enough, this condition will hold.
5 t hij . 1 for any i Z j and t hii 5 1. I also impose a triangular inequality to prevent transportation arbitrages: 5 1i, j, k 2 , 
tik # tij 3 tjk.
6 ln w has a standard deviation equal to 1/g. The assumption g . s 2 1 ensures that, in equilibrium, the size distri-
bution of firms has a finite mean.
7 See Luttmer (2002) for the most recent evidence.
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and the demand by consumers, exports from country i to country j in sector h, by a firm with a 
labor productivity w, are
(4)  x hij 1w 2 5 phij 1w 2 q hij 1w 2 5 mhyj aphij 1w 2P hj b 1 2 sh,
where P hj is the ideal price index for good h in country j. If only those firms above the productiv-
ity threshold w–hkj in country k and sector h export to country j, the ideal price index for good h in 
country j, Pj, and dividends per share, p, are defined as
(5)  P hj 5 qaN
k 51
 wk Lk 3
`
whkj
 a sh
sh 2 1
 
wkthkj
w
b 1 2 sh dGh 1w 2r 1/ 11 2 sh 2 ;
(6)  p 5 
aH
h51
aN
k, l51
wkLka3`
whkl
phkl 1w 2dGh 1w 2 b
aN
n51
wnLn
 ,
where phkl 1w 2 5 1 p hkl 1w 2 2 c hkl 1w 2 2 q hkl 1w 2 2 fklh are the net profits that a firm with productivity w 
in country k and sector h earns from exporting to country l.
For now, I will consider only sector h. The other sectors are analogous. For notational clarity, 
I drop the h subscript and all sectoral variables will refer to sector h when there is no ambiguity.
II.  Trade with Heterogeneous Firms
In this section, I compute the global equilibrium of this world economy. To do so, I solve for 
the selection of firms into different export markets. I generate predictions for aggregate bilateral 
trade flows.
A firm chooses a subset of countries where it sells its output, and sets prices for its good in 
each market, taking the strategies of other firms and of consumers as given. Consumers chose 
the quantity consumed of each variety available domestically, given prices. All agents move 
simultaneously, and an equilibrium is a fixed point to their strategies. Firms decide whether to 
enter a given market depending on how much competition they expect to face in that market. 
The toughness of competition in turn depends on which firms enter. I derive the solution to this 
selection problem, which turns out to be quite tractable.
Productivity Threshold.—Less productive firms are not able to generate enough profits abroad 
to cover the fixed cost of entering foreign markets. Exporters are therefore only a subset of 
domestic firms. This subset varies with the characteristics of the foreign market. The profits firm 
w earns when exporting from i to j are pij 1w 2 5 m/s yj 3s/ 1s 2 12 1wi tij/w 2 / Pj 412s 2 fij. Define 
the threshold w–ij from pij 1w–ij 2 5 0 as the productivity of the least productive firm in country i 
able to export to country j:
(7)  w–ij 5 l1 a fijY    j b1/ 1s212  witijPj ,
with l1 a constant.8 I assume that trade barriers are always high enough so that 5k, l, w–kl . 1.
8 l1 5 1s/m 21/ 1s212 1s/ 1s212 2 . 
VOL. 98 NO. 4 1713CHANEy: DISTORTED GRAVITy
Equilibrium Price Indices.—Until now, I have considered aggregate prices as given. They 
do adjust, however, depending on country characteristics. Thanks to two simplifying assump-
tions—wages are exogenously pinned down in the homogenous sector, and the number of poten-
tial entrants (not the number of actual entrants) is exogenously given—the set of firms that export 
to country j depends only on country j’s characteristics. Plugging the productivity thresholds 
from equation (7) into the price index from equation (5), I can solve for the equilibrium price 
index:
(8)  Pj 5 l2 3 yj
1/g21/ 1s212 3 uj,
where uj
2g ; gNk 51 1yk / y 2 3 1wk tkj 22g 3 fkj2 3g/ 1s212214 , y is world output, and l2 is a constant.9
An aggregate index of j’s remoteness from the rest of the world is given by uj.10 It is reminis-
cent of the “multilateral resistance variable” introduced by Anderson and Eric Van Wincoop 
(2003). In addition to their measure, it takes into account the impact of fixed costs and of firm 
heterogeneity on aggregate prices.
Equilibrium Exports, Thresholds, and Profits.—Exports by an individual firm depend on its 
productivity, the trade barriers it must overcome, aggregate demand, the set of competitors it is 
facing, and the price they set. Plugging the general equilibrium price index from equation (8) into 
the demand function, and into the productivity threshold from equation (7), I can solve simulta-
neously for firm level exports the productivity thresholds and total world profits. In general equi-
librium, exports xij 1w 2 from country i to country j by an individual firm with productivity w, the 
productivity threshold w–ij above which firms in i export to j, aggregate output yj , and dividends 
per share p, are given by
(9)   xij 1w 2 5 • l3 3 aY jY b 1s212 / g 3 a ujwitijb s21 3 ws21, if w $ w–ij
 0  otherwise,
 µ w–ij 5 l4 3 aYY jb 1/g 3 awitijuj b 3 fij1/ 1s212 ,  yi 5 11 1 l52 3 wi Li,
 p 5 l5,
9
lg2 5 ag 2 1s 2 1 2
g
b as
m
b g/ 1s21221a s
s 2 1b g a1 1 pY b .
 Note that there is a slight abuse of notations, as dividends per share 1p2 and world output (Y) will be endogenously 
determined in equilibrium. However, firms as well as consumers take total world profits and output as a constant. I will 
solve for 1p, y2 in equilibrium.
10 A simple way to interpret this aggregate index is to look at a symmetrical case: when wktkj 5 wtj and fkj 5 fj for 
all k’s, uj 5 fj
1/ 1s212 2 1/g 3 wtj. In asymmetric cases, uj is a weighted average of bilateral trade barriers.
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with l3, l4, and l5 as constants.11 Equilibrium variables are functions of fundamentals only: the 
size Lj ,12 the productivity wi, the trade barriers fij and tij, and the measure of j ’s remoteness from 
the rest of the world, uj.
As expected from this simple monopolistic competition model, exports by individual firms 
depend on the transportation cost tij with an elasticity s 2 1. Firm-level trade is very similar to 
what a traditional model of trade with representative firms would predict for aggregate bilateral 
trade flows. In contrast, because of the selection of firms into the export market, aggregate bilat-
eral trade in the present model will look radically different.
PROPOSITION 1 (Aggregate Trade): Total exports (f.o.b.) X hij in sector h from country i to 
country j are given by
(10)  Xhij 5 mh 3 
Y   
 i 3 Y    j
Y  3 awithijuhj b2gh 3 1  fijh 22 3gh/ 1sh212214 .
Exports are a function of country sizes 1yi and yj 2 ,13 workers’ productivity 1wi 2 , the bilateral 
trade costs, variable 1t hij 2 and fixed 1  fijh 2 , and the measure of j’s remoteness from the rest of the 
world 1uhj 2 .14
PROOF:
See the Appendix.
The gravity structure of trade has been dramatically distorted by the presence of firm 
heterogeneity.
First note that the elasticity of exports with respect to variable trade barriers, g, is larger than 
in the absence of firm heterogeneity, and larger than the elasticity for each individual firm (both 
equal to s 2 1). A reduction in variable costs not only causes an increase in the size of exports 
of each exporter, but also allows some new firms to enter. The extensive margin comes on top of 
the intensive margin and amplifies the impact of variable costs. This amplification effect is quan-
titatively important. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) argue that if one assumes that trade is 
governed by an underlying model of trade with identical firms, trade barriers between the United 
States and Canada must be equivalent to a 46 percent tariff in order to explain the observed 
bilateral trade flows (for a benchmark case with s 5 8). In the presence of firm heterogeneity, 
11 l3 5 sl4
12s, l4 5 3s/m 3 g/ 3g 2 1s 2 12 4 3 1/ 11 1 l52 41/g, and
l5 5 
aH
h51
ash 2 1
gh
bmh
sh
1 2 aH
h51
ash 2 1
gh
b  mh
sh
.
I am grateful to Sebastian Krautheim for helpful suggestions on computing aggregate profits.
12 The elasticity of individual firms’ exports with respect to the destination market yj is less than one. This is due to 
the impact of market size on the degree of price competition: as the size of the market grows, more firms enter, which 
eat up part of the market shares of existing exporters.
13 GDP is proportional to labor income: yi 5 11 1 l52 wi Li.
14 Note that the ratio of i’s market share in k, and j ’s market share in k, depends only on the ratio of i’s trade barri-
ers and j ’s trade barriers. If I define the composite measure of trade barriers kik 5 1wi tik 22g 3 fik2 3g2 1s212 4 / 1s212 , I get: 1Xik / yi 2 / 1Xjk /yj 2 5 kik /kjk . Similarly, i ’s market share in k depends only on trade barriers from i relative to trade barriers 
from other countries: Xik / Xk 5 3 1Li / L2kik / gj 1Lj / L2kjk 4 . 
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and using a heterogeneity parameter estimated from firm-level data 1g/ 1s 2 12 < 22 ,15 I would 
infer from the same trade volume data that trade barriers are equivalent to a 21 percent tariff 11.21 5 !1.462 .16 This is far below their 46 percent estimate.
Second, the elasticity of exports with respect to transportation costs depends on the degree of 
firm heterogeneity, g. In more homogenous sectors 1g high 2 , large productive firms represent a 
smaller fraction of firms. The productivity threshold moves in a region where most of the mass 
of firms lies. In those sectors, aggregate exports are sensitive to changes in transportation costs 
because many firms exit and enter when variable costs fluctuate.
Third and most important, the elasticity of exports with respect to variable costs does not 
depend at all on the elasticity of substitution between goods, s,17 and the elasticity of exports 
with respect to fixed costs is negatively related to the elasticity s. This prediction is in stark con-
trast with models with representative firms. In such models, the elasticity of exports with respect 
to transportation costs would be equal to s 2 1.
III.  Intensive versus Extensive Margins of Trade
In this section, I describe how the elasticity of substitution magnifies the sensitivity of the 
intensive margin to trade barriers and dampens the sensitivity of the extensive margin. I prove 
that the dampening effect on the extensive margin dominates the magnifying effect on the inten-
sive margin.
Thus far, I have shown that in the presence of firm heterogeneity, the selection of firms into the 
export market becomes a key feature of the adjustment of trade flows. The main prediction of the 
model is that the extensive margin and the intensive margin are affected in opposite directions by 
the elasticity of substitution. If the elasticity of substitution is high, then the impact of trade bar-
riers is strong on the intensive margin and mild on the extensive margin. The reverse holds true 
when the elasticity of substitution is low. The dampening effect of the elasticity of substitution on 
the extensive margin dominates the magnifying effect on the intensive margin.
PROPOSITION 2 (Intensive and Extensive Margins): The elasticity of substitution 1s2 has no 
effect on the elasticity of trade flows with respect to variable trade costs 1z2 , and a negative 
effect on the elasticity of trade flows with respect to fixed costs 1j 2:
 if z ; 2 
d ln X ij
d ln tij
 and j ; 2 
d ln X ij
d ln fij
, then 
'z
's
 5 0 and 
'z
's
 , 0.
15 I measure g/ 1s 2 12 as the regression coefficient of the log of rank (ordering US firms according to their sales in 
the United States) on the log of sales, using Compustat data on US listed firms. With an alternative method using the 
propensity of French firms to export to multiple markets, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2007) find a smaller number, 
g/ 1s 2 12 < 1.5.
16 To make the two models comparable, despite the presence of fixed entry costs, I assume the entry cost into any 
Canadian province is the same for US and Canadian firms.
17 Eaton and Kortum (2002) derive a similar prediction from a different setup. In a Ricardian model of trade, they 
find that bilateral trade flows do not depend on the elasticity of substitution between goods, but only on the scaling 
parameter of the underlying distribution of productivity shocks. They use Fréchet distributions, which approach Pareto 
distributions in their right tails: the distribution for shocks they consider is 1 2 F 1z 2 5 1 2 e2Tz2u 5
z S 1`
 Tz2u 1 o 1z2u2 .
In equilibrium, they predict that the elasticity of trade flows with respect to trade barriers (variable only) is equal to u.
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PROOF:
To prove this proposition, I introduce formally the intensive and the extensive margins of 
trade. I describe the adjustment of each margin, and the sensitivity of these adjustments to the 
elasticity of substitution.
The impact of trade barriers, both variable and fixed, on aggregate trade flows can be decom-
posed into two different margins. The intensive margin is defined by how much each existing 
exporter changes the size of its exports. The extensive margin is defined by how much new 
entrants export (in the case of a reduction in trade barriers).
Differentiating the expression for aggregate exports, Xij 5 wiLi e`wij xij 1w 2 dG 1w 2 , I get the fol-
lowing expressions for each margin:18
 dXij 5 awi Li 3`
wij
 
'xij 1w 2
'tij
 dG 1w 2b dtij 2 awi Li x 1w–ij 2 G9 1w–ij 2 3 'wij'tijb dtij
 1 awi Li 3`
wij
 
'xij 1w 2
'fij
 dG 1w 2b d fij 2 awi Li x 1w–ij 2 G9 1w–ij 2 3 'wij'fij b d fij  .
 8	8
	 Intensive margin Extensive margin
Following a reduction of trade barriers, each existing exporter 1w . w–ij 2 exports more. This is the 
intensive margin. At the same time, higher potential profits attract new entrants 1w–ij goes down 2 . 
This is the extensive margin.
In elasticity notations, I get the following expression for each margin for changes in the vari-
able cost, tij:19
 z ; 2 
d ln X ij
d ln tij
 5 1s 2 12 1 1g 2 1s 2 12 2 5 g  .
	 3	 3
 Intensive margin Extensive margin
 Elasticity Elasticity
When variable costs move 1s 2 1 increases with s2 , s magnifies the intensive margin, whereas 
it dampens the extensive margin 1g 2 1s 2 12 decreases with s2 .20 The effect of s on each mar-
gin cancels out, so that
 
'z
's
 5 0.
18 I use Leibniz rule to separate the intensive from the extensive margin. I apply Lebesgue’s monotone convergence 
theorem to ensure the existence of, and to compute, the intensive margin.
19 See the Appendix for a complete derivation.
20 I have implicitly assumed that changes in both tij and fij have no significant impact on the general equilibrium. 
That is, I have assumed that 0uj/0tij 5 0uj/0 fij 5 0. This is a fair approximation as long as country i is not too large 
compared to the rest of the world 1yi / y small). Relaxing this assumption would reinforce my results, but it would make 
calculations cumbersome. See the Technical Appendix (available at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/
aer.98.4.1707 for a derivation of the general case.
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In elasticity notation, I get the following expression for each margin for changes in the fixed 
costs, fij:
 j ; 2 
d ln X ij
d ln fij
 5  0 1 
g
s 2 1 2 1 5 
g
s 2 1 2 1. 3	 3
 Intensive margin Extensive margin
 Elasticity Elasticity
When only fixed costs move, s has no impact on the intensive margin, whereas it dampens the 
impact on the extensive margin 1g / 1s 2 12 2 1 decreases with s2 . The impact of s on the elas-
ticity of trade flows with respect to fixed costs is always negative:
 
'j
's
 , 0.
The intuition for these results is the following. When goods are highly differentiated 1s is 
low2 , the demand for each individual variety is relatively insensitive to changes in trade costs. 
In other words, when s is low, trade barriers have little impact on the intensive margin of trade. 
This margin is the only one in the Krugman model of trade with representative firms.
The interaction between the elasticity of substitution and the extensive margin is more com-
plex. When s is low, the market share that each firm is able to capture is relatively insensitive to 
differences in productivity. Less productive firms are still able to capture a relatively large mar-
ket share, despite having to charge a higher price than other firms. As trade barriers decrease, 
some firms with a low level of productivity are able to enter. When goods are highly differenti-
ated 1s is low2 , these new entrants are relatively large compared to the firms that are already 
exporting. Therefore, the extensive margin is strongly affected by trade barriers when s is low. 
The reverse holds when s is high.
In this section, I have explained why the elasticity of substitution has opposite effects on the 
intensive and the extensive margins of trade. A higher elasticity of substitution makes the inten-
sive margin more sensitive to changes in trade barriers, whereas it makes the extensive margin 
less sensitive. What is the net impact of s on the two margins? I prove in Proposition 2 that with 
Pareto distributed productivity shocks, the extensive margin always dominates. Contrary to the 
predictions of the Krugman model with representative firms, the elasticity of substitution s 
always dampens the impact of trade barriers on trade flows.
IV.  Conclusion
Introducing firm heterogeneity leaves many of the predictions of the Krugman (1980) model 
of international trade unaffected. Most important, the gravity structure of bilateral trade flows 
is preserved. In this paper, I have identified a key difference between the Krugman model with 
representative firms and a model with firm heterogeneity. The impact of trade barriers is damp-
ened by the elasticity of substitution, and not magnified by it. I introduce fixed export costs and 
adjustments on the extensive margin in a simple model of international trade. A high elasticity 
of substitution translates productivity differences into large differences in size. As firm sizes 
get more dispersed, fixed costs have a lesser impact on exports: large firms can easily overcome 
those fixed costs. Aggregate trade flows are less sensitive to trade barriers when goods are more 
substitutable.
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Appendix
PROPOSITION 1 (Reminded): Total exports (f.o.b.) X hij in sector h from country i to country j 
are given by
 X hij 5 mh 3 
Y   
 i 3 Y    j
Y  3 awithijuhj b2gh 3 1 f  hij 22 1gh / 1sh212212 .
Exports are a function of country sizes 1yi and yj 2 , workers’ productivity 1wi 2 , the bilateral 
trade costs, variable 1t hij 2 and fixed 1 f  hij 2 , and the measure of j’s remoteness from the rest of the 
world 1uhj 2 .
PROOF:
Aggregate exports from i to j are defined as the sum of export of each individual firm with 
productivity w $ w–ij
h:
 X hij 5 wi Li 3
`
whij
 x hij 1w 2 dGh 1w 2 .
From equation (9) we know the size of firm-level exports x hij 1w Z w $ w–ijh 2 and the productivity 
threshold w–ij
h. Using the specific assumption about the distribution Gh of productivity shocks 
from equation (3), we can rewrite aggregate exports as
 X hij 5 wi Li 3
`
whij
 l3
h 3 aY    jY b 1s 2 12 / g 3 a uhjwithijb s213 wsh21 3 w2gh21gh   dw,
 with w–ij
h 5 lh4 3 aYY
 
  j
b 1/g 3 awithij
uhj
b 3 fijh 11/ 1s212 2 ,
where lh3 and l
h
4 are some constants.21 Given the assumption of Pareto distributed productivity 
and isoelastic preferences, we get a simple solution for the integral. After solving the integral 
and rearranging, we get
 X hij 5 lh 3 
wi Li Y    j
Y  3 awithijuhj b2gh 3 1 f  hij 22 1gh / 1sh212212 ,
with lh 5 11 1 l52 3 mh. Noting that yi 5 11 1 l52 wiLi, we get
 X hij 5 mh 3 
Y   
 i 3 Y    j
Y  3 awithijuhj b2gh 3 1 f  hij 22 1gh / 1sh212212 .
PROPOSITION 2 (Reminded):
 (i) The elasticity of the intensive margin of trade with respect to variable trade costs is 1s 2 12.
  (ii) The elasticity of the extensive margin of trade with respect to variable costs is 1g 2 1s 2 122.
21 lh3 5 s 1lh4212s, lh4 5 3sh /mh 3 gh/ 1gh 2 1sh 2 12 2 3 1/ 11 1 l52 41/gh, and l5 5 5 3 gHh51 1 1sh 2 12 / gh 2 1mh/sh 2 4 / 
 312gHh51 1 1sh 2 12 / gh 2 1mh /sh 2 4 6.
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  (iii) The elasticity of the intensive margin of trade with respect to fixed costs is 0.
  (iv)  The elasticity of the extensive margin of trade with respect to fixed costs is 3g 2 1s 2 124  /  1s 2 12.
PROOF:
 (i) The definition of the intensive and the extensive margins from Proposition 2 gives us
 2 
d ln X ij
d ln tij
 5 
2dX ij/dtij
X ij/tij
 5 2
tij
X ij
 awiLi 3`
wij
 
'xij 1w 2
'tij
 dG 1w 2b 1 tijX ij awi Li x 1w–ij 2 G9 1w–ij 2 3 'wij'tijb
 8	8
	 Intensive margin elasticity Extensive margin elasticity
 2 
d ln X ij
d ln fij
 5 
2dX ij/dfij
X ij/fij
 5 2
fij
X ij
 awiLi 3`
wij
 
'xij 1w 2
'fij
 dG 1w 2b 1 fijX ij awi Li x 1w–ij 2 G9 1w–ij 2 3 'wij'fij b .
 8	8
	 Intensive margin elasticity Extensive margin elasticity
Using the definition of equilibrium individual exports from equation (9), and assuming that 
country i is small enough and/or remote enough, so that 0uj /0tij 5 2g 1yi / y2 3 wi2g tij2g21 3 
fij
2 3g2 1s212 4 / 1s212 < 0, we get
 
'xij 1w 2
'tij
5 2 1s 2 12 xij 1w 2
tij
.
Integrating over all exporters, we get
 Elasticity of the intensive margin
 with respect to variable costs 5 2
tij
X ij
 awiLi 3`
wij
 
'xij 1w 2
'tij
 dG 1w 2b  wiLi 3`
wij
 xij 1w 2 dG 1w 2   5 1s 2 12 tijX ij                   tij  5 1s 2 12 tijX ij X ijtij
 5 1s 2 12 .
 (ii) Using the definition of the equilibrium productivity threshold from equation (9), we get
  
'wij
'tij
 5 
wij
tij
  .
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Using the definition of firm-level exports xij(w) 5 lijw
s21 from equation (9), and the definition 
of the distribution of productivity shocks G9(w) 5 w2g21/g from equation (3), we can rewrite 
aggregate exports in the following way:
 Xij 5 wi Li 3
`
whij
 xij 1w 2 dG 1w 2
 5 wi Li 3
`
wij
 lijw
s21 
w2g21
g
 dw
 5 
11g 2 1s 2 1 2 2g wiLi lijs21 w–ij1s2122g
 5 
1
g 2 1s 2 1 2  3 wiLi xij 1w–ij2 G9 1w–ij2 3 w–ij .
We therefore get the simple solution for the elasticity:
 Elasticity of the extensive margin
 with respect to variable costs 5 
tij
X ij
 awiLi x 1w–ij2 G9 1w–ij2 3 'wij'tijb
 5 
tij
X ij
 awi Li x 1wij 2G r 1wij 2 3 wij
tij
b
 5 1g 2 1s 2 12 2 tijX ij X ijtij
 5 1g 2 1s 2 12 2 .
 (iii) Using the definition of the equilibrium firm-level exports from equation (9), we get
 
'xij 1w 2
'fij
 5 0.
We directly derive that the elasticity of the intensive margin of trade with respect to fixed costs 
is 0.
 (iv) Using the definition of the equilibrium productivity threshold from equation (9), we get
 
'wij
'fij
 5 
1
s 2 1 3 
wij
fij
,
and using the same procedure as in (ii), we prove that the elasticity of the extensive margin with 
respect to fixed trade costs is g/ 1s 2 12 2 1.
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